SSN: A Strategy Guide to Submarine Warfare Read online

  Down in San Diego is the sub base at Ballast Point. While the permanent facilities at this location are not as developed as other bases (it is literally carved into the side of Point Loma), it is located adjacent to the immense naval facilities in San Diego, and considered by the sub crews and their families a great place to be based.

  Though the permanent facilities at Ballast Point are not as well developed as Bangor and some of the other bases, it has an amazing array of submarine tenders, floating drydocks, and other support ships to provide infrastructure for the many boats and submersibles based there. The major submarine organization located at Ballast Point is SUBGRU 5, which has a number of subordinate units in addition to several attached SSNs and a tender. The first is Submarine Development Group (SUBDEVGRU) 1, which is equipped with several tenders and a rescue ship, as well as two research submersibles and the two DSRV rescue submarines. Also subordinate to SUBGRU 5 are SUBRON 3, with nine SSNs and a tender, as well as SUBRON 11, with seven SSNs and a tender.

  Farther out in the Pacific is the submarine base at Pearl Harbor. Most of the facilities at Pearl Harbor date back to World War II, when the Pacific submarine force underwent a huge expansion to support the offensive operations against Japan. Today the base is still vital to submarine operations in the Pacific. The headquarters organization for the Pacific fleet, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) is based here with a tender forward deployed at Guam. Subordinate to COMSUBPAC at Pearl Harbor are SUBRON 1 with eight SSNs and SUBRON 7 with ten SSNs. This large concentration of subs is designed to support U.S. Navy operations in the western Pacific, and boats from Pearl Harbor will frequently be assigned to support carrier groups as they rotate through the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

  Atlantic Fleet

  The deepest roots of the U.S. submarine forces are back in the Atlantic. Here is where the boats are built and tested, and where most of the institutional infrastructure exists. This is also where the deepest cuts have occurred, and will probably continue to be made in the months and years to come. The winning of the Cold War has not been kind to the submarine force in the Atlantic fleet, and already one major base at Holy Loch, Scotland, with its assigned SUBRON 14 (nine SSBNs and a tender) has been completely closed down. As the submarine force continues to draw down, it is sometimes ironic to think that the Atlantic SSN/SSBN force, which did so much to keep the peace and win the Cold War, will be decimated by the victory they were so helpful in forging.

  The headquarters for Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT) is located at the sprawling U.S. naval facility in Norfolk, Virginia. From here COMSUBLANT controls the largest force of SSNs and SSBNs in the U.S. Navy, at a number of different facilities. Farthest from home are SUBGRU 8 and SUBRON 22 (one submarine tender) based at La Maddalena, Sardinia. Though they do not have any submarines directly attached, these two units directly support the very active U.S. submarine operations in the Mediterranean Sea.

  Closer to home, the Atlantic SSBN force is controlled by SUBGRU 10 at Kings Bay, Georgia. This includes SUBRON 16 with the last of the Trident I/C4-equipped Lafayette-class boats. Also under SUBGRU 10 at Kings Bay is SUBRON 20, with a force of five or six Ohio-class SSBNs and their Trident missiles. Essentially duplicating the facilities at Bangor, Washington, Kings Bay is another of the new generation of sub bases developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While the permanent facilities are quite nice, saying that Kings Bay is a pork barrel base is something of an understatement. Called the “Jimmy Carter memorial submarine base” by many people in the submarine force, it is something of a concession to the power of the State of Georgia, especially to Senator Sam Nunn and former president Jimmy Carter.

  The other major facility on the Atlantic coast is the sub base at Groton, Connecticut. Let’s go there now and get to know more about “the home of the dolphins.”

  Groton—Home of the Dolphins

  If you drive or take a train northeast from New York City, you will come eventually to the quiet seacoast town of Groton, Connecticut. Here in this little New England seaport you will find the institutional womb of the U.S. submarine force, the U.S. Submarine Base. Within a few miles of this base is the EB building yard, as well as the schools and facilities where virtually every U.S. submariner will, at some time or another, spend time. The most important organization based here is SUBGRU 2. Based in a handsome turn-of-the-century building on the waterfront, it is the command organization for all attack submarines on the Atlantic coast. Currently it is commanded by Rear Admiral David M. Gobel, USN. This includes SUBRON 2 with ten SSNs, two support ships, and the nuclear-powered research submarine NR-1; SUBRON 10 with five SSNs and a support vessel; and SUBDEVRON 12 with six SSNs. In addition to the Groton-based units, SUBRON 2 also controls SUBRON 4 in Charleston, South Carolina (ten SSNs and a tender), as well as SUBRON 6 (seven SSNs and a tender) and SUBRON 8 (ten SSNs and a tender) in Norfolk, Virginia.

  As you stroll along the Groton waterfront—and I recommend that you have an escort—you will see almost the full range of SSNs in the U.S. Navy, from the old Permit-class boats currently undergoing decommissioning, to the newest 688I-class boats like the USS Miami (SSN-755). At times it is a place of bizarre contrasts, as the beauty of the New England coastline merges with the low, dark, ominous shapes of the boats. Of particular interest is the dock leading to the boats of SUBDEVRON 12. This is the unit tasked with evaluating new equipment and tactics that will be utilized by the rest of the submarine force. For example, USS Memphis (SSN-691) is currently evaluating the first of the nonpenetrating mast periscope systems that will probably become standard on all new submarines built by the United States.

  If you walk up the hill you come to the part of the base that houses the various facilities of the Submarine School. As the primary training pipeline for virtually every U.S. submariner, it is held in special reverence by the men of the U.S. submarine force. In the sprawl of dormitory-style housing, classrooms, and other buildings are some of the most sophisticated training devices ever designed. Not only do these facilities support the Submarine School with its new officer and enlisted recruits, they also provide periodic refresher training for submarine crews when they are in port. Many of the skills taught in these trainers are called brittle or perishable, since they may be forgotten if not practiced regularly.

  One whole building is devoted to ship control trainers, where officers and men can learn how to control every type of submarine in the U.S. inventory. The trainers can teach you everything from how to do “angles and dangles”—maneuvering the helmsman and planesman control consoles—to the ever-popular “emergency blow.” The trainers resemble those used to teach fighter pilots, and are exact replicas of the control rooms of the subs they represent.

  Another trainer that will stun the untrained observer is the “buttercup,” or flooding trainer. This is essentially a huge swimming pool with a replica of a submarine machinery room inside. From a control room in the side of the trainer, instructors can teach a group of men in real-world conditions how to control flooding casualties ranging from pinpoint leaks in pipes to a huge leak, over 1,000 gallons/3,375 liters per minute, in a main seawater flange connection. The idea is to control a series of leaks around the trainer that can fill it in just a matter of minutes. The training scenarios assume the feeling of a frantic fight for survival, and the crews that take the course love it for the confidence it builds and hate it for the discomfort it generates. If they do it right, the water will be roughly up to their waists if, and when, they finally control the flooding. I should say that the water for this trainer comes from a 20,000-gallon storage tank and is very cold.

  Of all the trainers at Groton, none is more impressive than the firefighting trainer in the new facility at Street Hall. This new facility is a positive response to the firefighting casualties incurred on the USS Bonefish (SS-582) and the USS Stark (FFG-31) during the 1980s. Where previously firefighting training was conducted inside a large sewer conduit f
illed with blazing diesel fuel, it is now conducted in a state-of-the-art trainer that can simulate virtually every fire situation and condition that a submarine sailor might encounter. The trainer replicates, much like the flooding trainer, an engine room on an SSN. Placed strategically around the trainer are a series of propane burners designed to simulate hydraulic oil, fuel oil, electrical, and insulation (called lagging) fires.

  A firefighting team from the USS Gato (SSN-615) practices their skills in the fire-fighting trainer in Street Hall, Sub Base, Groton, Connecticut. JOHN D. GRESHAM

  After the crews don Nomex jumpsuits and select breathing gear—either a hose-fed compressed air mask from the Emergency Air Breathing (EAB) system or a walkaround breathing system called an Oxygen Breathing Apparatus (OBA), which uses a chemical cartridge to generate oxygen for the user—the drills begin. With all the burners lit, the temperature climbs rapidly toward the training maximum of 145°F/67°C, and there is a decided howl from the fire.

  Firefighting team practice. Note the team leader, who is using a naval infrared thermal imager (NIFTI) to direct the team’s efforts. JOHN D. GRESHAM

  Training instructors are constantly supervising the trainees to make sure their equipment is functioning properly and they are breathing regularly, for above 130°F/58°C, the part of the brain that makes a human breathe automatically shuts down, forcing the trainees to breathe consciously on their own. In addition, the instructors add chemically generated smoke, which can reduce visibility down to about 6 inches. It is like something out of Dante’s Inferno, and while it is exciting to watch, even the knowledge that it is a drill cannot prevent feelings of terror.

  To fight the simulated fires, the trainees are equipped with a variety of fire extinguishers, fire hoses, and a new thermal imaging device called NIFTI (Navy Infrared Thermal Imager—pronounced “nifty”). This British-built device allows a sailor to “see” a fire through the smoke by the heat signature of the fire. So sensitive is the NIFTI that a human body can be located by looking for the heat of human metabolism. The fire extinguishers are designed to fight a variety of different fires. The new AFFF extinguishers, which throw a soapy slurry, are the most popular. Finally, there are a number of fire hoses that can be used to fight the simulated fires.

  All in all, the Street Hall facility is a model of high-fidelity training, and similar facilities are being built at other naval bases around the United States.

  All of these trainers are very expensive to build, operate, and maintain; in a time of declining funding, they are naturally the targets of those who would cut the defense budget. Nevertheless, I would contend that it is better to decommission an SSN or two rather than give up the valuable training that these facilities provide to the force. For while it is tough to get the money to operate and maintain an asset like a Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine, the sub is just a mass of metal without the men qualified to operate and fight her. The facilities at Groton and other bases are a tribute to the old saying that goes, “If you think training is expensive, try ignorance!”

  The Boat: A Tour of USS Miami (SSN-755)

  The Improved SSN-688 Design

  Of all the nuclear submarines designed by the United States, none has been the subject of more political infighting and controversy than the Los Angeles (SSN-688) class. The design has its roots in a series of incidents that occurred in the late 1960s, right at the time the United States was trying to decide just what kind of nuclear attack submarine (SSN) to build to replace the highly successful Sturgeon-class boats. The infighting began with the desire of then-Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover to build a high-speed (over 35 knots)9 submarine capable of directly supporting the fleet of aircraft carriers that represented the backbone of American seapower.

  The U.S. Navy organization charged with actually developing the specifications and design for the next generation of SSN, the Naval Sea Systems Command (Navsea), favored a design called Conform that would not be as fast as Rickover’s design, but would have the advantage in areas such as habitability and quieting.

  In the end, the decisive event that swung the situation in Rickover’s favor was something known today as the Enterprise incident, which was a shock to the U.S. Navy and intelligence communities. In early 1969 the carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and her escorts left their base in California for a war cruise to Vietnam. As she left harbor, U.S. national intelligence picked up message traffic indicating that the Soviet Union was going to dispatch a November-class SSN to intercept the carrier and her group. In an attempt to establish once and for all just how capable the first-generation Soviet SSNs were, the top battle group was provided with air cover from ASW aircraft and then told to outrun the November. It did not quite work out though, as the presumably slower Russian boat was able to match speed with the Enterprise . At 30 knots the game was called off. When word reached Washington, D.C., it caused rapid reassessment of just how capable the Russian SSNs really were.

  Up until that point, it was assumed that the Novembers were only capable of speeds like those of the Nautilus and the Skates, around 20 knots. Yet here was one doing 50 percent better than that and not even trying! And what did this mean about the newer generation boats, such as the Victor I and II classes? In addition, there were mounting indications that the Soviets were working on a new class of deep-diving (over 2,000 feet/700 meters), extremely high speed (over 40 knots) SSNs.

  In fact, the performance of the Novembers was due to the extreme lack of radiation shielding. Much like a hot rod that has been stripped of everything that weighs it down, the Russian boat simply did not have to haul around the reactor shielding that every other civilized nation considered essential to the good health and safety of their sailors. The November’s superiority was based on a misinterpretation of the information, but there was no way to know that at the time. And Rickover was not a man to let slip an opportunity that would help justify his point of view. Through his network of Navy and congressional supporters, he pressured the Navy to kill Conform and build a class of his high-speed fleet boats. In the end he won authorization for a twelve-boat class of his fleet submarines, though to help gain critical budget authorization votes in Congress, he broke with the longstanding Navy tradition of naming submarines after sea creatures and instead named them for the home cities of the twelve congressmen who swung their votes in his favor. (Rickover is alleged to have said, “Fish don’t vote!”)

  The first boat of the class, the Los Angeles (SSN-688), was to be the embodiment of his ideas of speed and power, but from the very start, it was a series of compromises. It is said that a camel is a horse designed by a committee, and the Los Angeles was no exception to that rule. The first problem had to do with fitting the massive S6G power plant into a hull with the dimensions needed to achieve the 35-knot speeds specified by Rickover. Quite simply, the reactor was going to come in 600 to 800 tons overweight. This meant that one or more of the key specifications of the boat—torpedo tubes/weapons load, habitability, radiated noise level, speed, sensors, or diving depth—was going to have to be reduced. The compromise was to thin the hull and limit the diving depth of the new boats to about three-fourths that of the Sturgeons and Permits (950 feet/300 meters). In addition there would be some severe compromises in habitability, forcing even more of the crew to hot bunk. As it was, there was very little reserve buoyancy (around 11 percent) and less growth potential than in any other SSN ever designed by the United States.

  Once the design of the Los Angeles was finalized, there was the matter of selecting a prime contractor. The Navy chose the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corp., despite their having submitted a bid that, in retrospect, was not capable of recouping even the costs of building the first group of twelve boats. Clearly, Electric Boat was “betting on the come”—that they could recover their lost profits from construction of boats beyond the first twelve units. Unfortunately, they did this at a time of relatively high inflation and recession in the economy, and the te
rms of the contract began to make it impossible for Electric Boat to break even on the first boats. Then a Navy inspection of welds found that a number of the boats had either faulty or missing welds on critical parts of the pressure hulls. This meant a number of the boats had to be completely rebuilt, further increasing costs to Electric Boat. In the end the U.S. Navy had to bail out Electric Boat and pay the costs of the overruns on the Flight I boats. This bailout caused a massive scandal that wound up costing General Dynamics the sole-source contract for the subs as well as causing the indictment of the Electric Boat yard manager on bribery charges. The Navy got the boats, but at a massive cost to the taxpayers.

  On the positive side, what the Navy and taxpayers did get were the fastest, quietest, most capable SSNs ever built. On trials, the new boats proved to be all that had been hoped for them. And in 1976, when the Los Angeles was commissioned and sent on patrol, she clearly marked the beginning of a new era of attack boats. Part of this came from the improved sensor suite. For the first time, an integrated sonar suite was included in the design of the boat from the very start. In addition, she was among the first boats to be able to take advantage of the new family of submarine weapons, the Mk 48 torpedo and the UGM-84 Harpoon antiship missile, that were coming on line at that time. Thus what the United States got with the Flight I Los Angeles- class boats was an extremely capable camel. V