Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1 Read online

  So I needed to be crystal clear to Ron.

  The battle tempo of VII Corps was my responsibility alone. It made no difference if there were misunderstandings or internal stops because of tactics selected by subordinate commanders — I alone would be accountable, and that was the way it should be. So if I did not like what a unit was doing, then it was my job to tell the commander to do something else, or else to go see him, get an explanation, and then decide.

  As Ron Griffith and I met, the fight for al-Busayyah was well under way. Ron was attempting to finish that fight and press forward to Collins, where I had ordered him to be later this morning.

  First AD had attacked al-Busayyah with two brigades abreast. On the left was the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Monty Meigs, with four battalion task forces (three tank and one Bradley). On the right was the 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Jim Riley, with three battalion task forces (two Bradley and one tank). Riley's brigade passed to the east of Purple in the early morning and turned ninety degrees east, continuing to attack in the center of the 1st AD and north of 3rd Brigade. Most of the fighting inside al-Busayyah was done by Lieutenant Colonel Mike McGee's 6/6 INF, supported by a combat engineer vehicle that turned many of the buildings to rubble, and killed or buried the commando defenders who refused to surrender. Most of the action fell to the 2nd Brigade.

  I greeted Ron with the news of the RGFC contact to his south.

  The attack on Purple was going well, he reported. He would finish it with one brigade, and would be in the northern part of Collins with the other two brigades to continue the attack by late morning. That was a little later than I had wanted, but all right, since he'd have two brigades to continue the attack (the second brigade would rejoin the others after Purple was secured). It was not an easy maneuver, but Ron and the 1st AD would do it and form the northern part of our fist.

  "Ron," I said, giving him essentially the same order I had given to Butch Funk earlier, "I want you to press the fight all day. Do not stop. Continue the attack all day and into tonight."

  Ron was a strong commander and knew what he had to do. He would make it happen.

  I returned to the TAC FWD, about thirty kilometers away.

  1000 TAC FWD

  By now the 3rd AD had moved out to execute its maneuver east around the 2nd ACR and attack the Tawalkana, and so the TAC FWD stood by itself — two lone M577s with their twenty-foot canvas extensions still out the back. A few HMMWVs were scattered nearby, as were several commo trucks for the long-haul comms hookup. The troops were tired. Many had been up all night trying to make the comms work, while at the same time performing the Herculean task of keeping track of both a rapidly developing enemy situation and VII Corps units, all of which were on the move or in combat. I don't know how they did it.

  Our main TAC, with all the comms and G-3, still had not arrived, so the comms situation was not good. Good or not, there was not much I could do about it. We did have line-of-sight FM and two TACSAT radios, and a long-haul comm line into the main CP gave us a connection to Riyadh. As for my main TAC, I knew they could feel the situation wherever they were, and were making every effort to get forward out of the tangle of vehicles and get the TAC set to control the RGFC battles.

  Even without the comms, I was confident that all the commanders knew my intent and would make it happen. We had been over this situation in war games and were in one another's heads. I trusted them.

  At 1000, Tom Rhame showed up. I had told him to come forward and meet me at the TAC. I went over the friendly and enemy situations as I knew them at that point, then told him I wanted him in the fight as soon as possible, and I especially wanted to know when he would be ready to take the fight from the 2nd ACR. I figured that in another four hours or so, the regiment would be at the main positions of the Tawalkana. Based on what Don Holder and I had discussed the day before, I did not think that they would be able to go much farther.

  After I took him through these points, Tom gave me a quick SITREP on his progress.

  "Boss," he said, "we began movement at 0430, as soon as the British cleared, and we are now moving forward in the worst sandstorm I've ever seen. I had a hell of a time even finding you. Only GPS got me here. Worse, the sector to move in was so narrow that I had to put the division in a column of brigades. We'll be set on Phase Line Hartz before dark." Phase Line Hartz was about twenty kilometers west of Phase Line Smash.

  That was much slower than I had expected, but it was real. I knew Tom wasn't making excuses. If he could have gone faster, he would have. To act on what you have, not on what you wish you had, is another acquired skill for commanders. Friction is everywhere. You have to deal with it. You can't wish it away.

  "Roger," I replied. "Here's what I want you to do. Continue to move forward to Hartz as fast as you can. Then, from there, close on the rear of the 2nd ACR. Pass through the 2nd ACR, and continue the attack to seize Objective Norfolk. You are the southern division of our corps fist." In other words, I wanted him to attack through the Tawalkana and deep into the Iraqi stiffening defenses. Norfolk was on the other side of the Tawalkana.

  "WILCO."

  Tom left to make it happen. My orders had to be translated into division orders, and graphics had to be hand-drawn on paper maps (since the original FRAGPLAN 7 had 1st CAV listed on the overlays). And all this had to be done on the move.

  Meanwhile, I stayed at the TAC FWD. Though the comms there were marginal, I wanted to be near them — our own situation was fluid at the moment and I felt that was the best place to be. I also had the comfort of knowing that in the space of the last three hours, I had talked face-to-face with all of my division commanders, except Rupert Smith, and was confident that they would do what I expected them to do. The weather continued to be bad, with blowing sandstorms that limited visibility to 500 meters, or in some places less.

  A call came in from my main CP that an Air Force A-10 (a close-air-support aircraft) had fired on two British Warriors, killing nine British soldiers and wounding ten. Blue on blue — our worst nightmare. Because I was out of comms with Rupert Smith at that point, I thought about flying down to talk it over with him. But then I realized there was really nothing I could do.

  Could the British absorb that terrible loss and continue to drive on? I asked myself. I knew Rupert and his troops by now. I knew they would continue despite the shock that temporarily stuns a unit when such a tragedy occurs. It is one of those moments in battle when commanders and soldiers have to reach inside for the steel they know is there, and then go on. It would not be easy for them. It never is. Battle results are final and last forever. They are frozen in time. Dealing with such moments is the reason why you spend a lifetime training, learning, gaining experience. But you never get used to it. Never.

  Later I got a call from my main CP: at 0930, the 1st CAV had been released from CENTCOM reserve to VII Corps. This was H + 53.5 hours. A few days earlier, Cal Waller had estimated it would take twenty-four to thirty-six hours after H-Hour to get them released. John Yeosock wasn't so optimistic, but he did expect the 1st CAV release sometime that day.

  After the war, I learned that the tactical judgments at CENTCOM in Riyadh held that, soon after 0400 on Sunday, 24 February, we were in a state of pursuit. That meant that they were convinced the enemy was defeated and on the run, and that our job was to race after them and catch them. If such was the case, I wonder why it took more than two days to release the theater reserve so that they could take part in the pursuit.

  Because of John Yeosock's forecast the night before, I had been anticipating the 1st CAV release. I figured I would tell John Tilelli to back his division out of the Ruqi Pocket (he had two maneuver brigades at that point) and to go west to the breach, then move through it to Lee, a position we had designated eighty kilometers north of the breach and just west of where the 1st INF would pass through the 2nd ACR. Though it would be a move of about 150 kilometers, I estimated that John could be at Lee early the next day if he moved all night.
The 1st CAV was well practiced at long unit moves — the best in the theater.

  Just as Tom Rhame had done, John Tilelli used his initiative and called me right away — though how he got through to me with the fragile comms was a mystery. It also was a tribute to our signal troops, who were busting their butts trying to keep us in touch with the rest of the corps.

  "JAYHAWK 6, PEGASUS 6." PEGASUS 6 was John's call sign. "We've been chopped to VII Corps."

  "Roger," I answered, "welcome back to the team." Then I moved quickly to what I had in mind. "I want you to move your division as fast as you can to Area Lee. We are executing FRAGPLAN 7, and have just hit the RGFC. First INF will pass through 2nd ACR later today and attack east. Depending on how our attack goes today and tonight, I will commit you either around to the south of the 1st INF or around to the north of the 1st AD. Too soon to call."

  "WILCO. We're on the move."

  Even though he had still been under the command of CENTCOM, John had been thinking ahead and monitoring our situation. On their own initiative, he and his commanders had prepared for the two release possibilities: that they would either reinforce the Egyptians or go to us. John had had tentative plans and was ready to execute them, whichever way CENTCOM turned. And so they were soon on the move.

  DEVELOPMENTS IN-SECTOR THAT MORNING

  True to his earlier assurances, by late morning Ron Griffith had the 1st AD in the northern part of Collins and was attacking east. They had secured Purple and were on line with the 3rd AD to their south. The only disturbing note was that by now units of XVIII Corps were thirty to fifty kilometers behind the 1st AD, leaving Ron an open flank. To Ron's north in that sector were RGFC army-level artillery and three RGFC infantry divisions, reinforced with some armor. In other words, the open flank gave Ron other tactical situations to deal with until the XVIII Corps attack closed the gap. In my own mind, I began to question the feasibility of executing the Third Army two-corps attack plan.

  Meanwhile, Butch Funk had maneuvered the 3rd AD into two brigades forward (the 2nd on the left and the 1st on the right), with his 3rd Brigade in reserve. By a little after 0900, he was passing north of the 2nd ACR. Once that was done, Butch turned the 3rd AD sixty degrees east into his FRAGPLAN 7 attack zone, no easy maneuver on the move, and he would soon be in contact with the middle of the Tawalkana's hastily drawn defense.

  We now had a giant left hook forming, with 1st AD coming around on the outside, 3rd AD in the center, and 1st INF coming up on the right to take over from 2nd ACR, which was already moving east to initiate the attack. We had formed on the move the most powerful attacking armor force in the history of the U.S. Army, and maybe ever; the tank battle that followed was as big or bigger as any in history. We would hit the forming RGFC defense from south to north with a force the likes of which they had never imagined.

  I was later to learn that on his own initiative, Don Holder had linked the 2nd ACR TAC with the 3rd AD TAC, and smoothly coordinated the passage of 3rd AD to 2nd ACR's north. (He also was in contact with the British, on his south, who were pressing their attack aggressively to the east.) Simultaneously he had brought his regiment on line, with three squadrons abreast to get maximum combat power forward. By now his sector was the same as a division's, about thirty kilometers wide. I also later learned that, in order to prevent fratricide, Zanini's 3rd Brigade of 1st AD and Colonel Bob Higgins's 2nd Brigade of 3rd AD had established physical contact and put units together throughout the attack.

  All in all, it was an impressive display of teamwork. Much maneuvering of major forces and vehicles in a confined space in a short time. Much initiative at small-unit level. Everyone doing the little things to reduce the friction without being told. A combat team. I was proud of them.

  2ND ACR LATE MORNING

  Around noon, I flew over to 2nd ACR to see how much farther to push them into the RGFC and to learn if they had found the RGFC's southern flank. I was still thinking of passing 1st INF forward during the daylight, a much easier move than a night passage, and less risky for fratricide. But I also did not want to break the momentum of the attack and give the RGFC any more time to set their defense.

  Command judgment time. After 1st INF's all-day move, should I then push them in a night forward passage of lines into the attack? Or should I continue the attack with the 2nd ACR and pass the 1st INF the next day early in the daylight?

  In the back of my mind, I also was trying to figure what our next move should be, because if I wanted to continue the momentum, I needed to set it in motion soon. I needed to sustain the regimental attack until the last possible moment, and maybe even reinforce them temporarily. Perhaps another AH-64 battalion from corps? Hard to manage. I had the 11th Aviation Brigade focusing on a deep attack that night. Using them for this purpose would screw that up.

  At 1130, while I had still been at the TAC FWD, I had gotten the following SITREP over the radio from Dragoon:

  "Regiment along 52 Easting, encountering covering force of Tawalkana Division. Attached infantry and armor. Destroyed tank company by air. Contact with dug-in tanks. Possible cuts in flanks north-south." They knew they had located the southern flank of the Tawalkana when they stopped seeing T-72s and started seeing older equipment.

  I asked them then if they needed more AH-64s.

  "Request a battalion." The CAV never turned down combat power.

  They were already employing a battalion of Apaches from the 1st AD. If they needed another to continue, they might soon be at the end of their attack. I had to go talk to Don.

  At 1250, I arrived at the Dragoon TAC and got a quick SITREP from Don Holder and Steve Robinette.

  The Iraqis were in defensive positions. There were numerous reports of dug-in tanks, battalion defensive positions, some artillery fire. You could feel the defense beginning to stiffen. They might not be as skillful as they could have been, because we had not given them time to set a defense, but they were not running away, not here, and not in 1st AD or 3rd AD sectors. This was a different enemy from the one we'd encountered in their frontline infantry divisions. Those divisions had put up some fight, but they'd soon cracked when hit by our firepower. These units fought back; they were not surrendering at the rate we had seen earlier.

  Now to the question of where to make the passage with the 1st INF.

  Tom Rhame had said he would be at Hartz, ready to pass at dark. Hartz was at about 40 Easting (named after the north-south 40 grid line that ran through the battle area), or a little more than ten kilometers west of 52 Easting, where the 2nd ACR now was engaged. Don, Steve, and I estimated that the 2nd ACR could go another ten kilometers before they would be ready for the 1st INF to begin passage, which would make passage at about 60 Easting. That meant the 1st INF would roll into an area about twenty kilometers to the rear, take care of coordination, then move forward and make the passage.

  It was a judgment call. Don was reaching out to around 80 Easting with air, and he had a good feel for what was in front of him, and I could see in their faces that they still had a lot of fight left in them. But I had to decide where I thought the regiment would run out of combat power. Sixty Easting was my best judgment at the time. Don agreed.

  After I left, I went back to the corps TAC for some quick discussions with Brigadier General Mike Hall about our continuing frustrations with air/ground coordination. Mike promised to see what he could do to help. And just then — finally — the main TAC arrived.

  1325 VII CORPS TAC FWD

  Stan and I immediately huddled so that I could fill him in on the situation and on the orders I had given to the commanders, and then we talked over the best way to deal with placing the main TAC. Because the battle was rapidly moving east, we decided not to set up the TAC here, but instead to move forward to a location closer to where we anticipated the battles would be that night.

  Meanwhile, 1st INF's arrival estimates had been pushed back even further, but the 2nd ACR was still doing well; continuing the attack was no problem.

 
; At 1509, according to the 2nd ACR battle log, I called Ron Griffith and ordered him to "move east, gain contact," a reinforcement of the early-morning orders I had given him and a signal to anyone monitoring the command net of my intent for an increased tempo.

  At 1513, I got Don on the radio and amended my previous order to him to stop at the 60 Easting. "Recon forward. Gain contact," I told him. I now judged that 60 Easting was too soon, that they'd have to wait too long there for the 1st INF Division… Remember, this was art, not science. You can always change your mind as the situation changes, and especially if you have a unit with the agility and the aggressive young leaders of the 2nd ACR.

  With that, it was time to return to the 2nd ACR — who by then had engaged in a major battle with the Tawalkana.

  1600 2ND ACR

  Though by then the weather was marginal for flying, the high winds and sandstorms, having picked up, I got back to the 2nd ACR after a quick twenty-minute helo flight. I was glad that we had been able to make it back. There was an air of electricity in their TAC. Radios were alive and the noise level was high.

  The 2nd ACR TAC was feeling great.