Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq sic-1 Read online

  15 February—in an operation named Redstorm/Bugle, the 1st CAV fired MLRS and cannon artillery, while the VII Corps 2/6 Apache battalion of eighteen AH-64s attacked approximately seventy-five kilometers deep into Iraqi positions.

  17 February—using all of VII Corps's daily CAS (combat air support) allocations, the 1st CAV successfully destroyed numerous Iraqi artillery pieces, an MLR battery, a command post, and tanks in front of the division's sector. The following day, 1/7 CAV and 2/8 CAV, both battalion task forces of tanks and Bradleys, conducted a mounted reconnaissance forward, capturing enemy ammunition and killing defending Iraqi infantry. As they withdrew, they came under Iraqi artillery fire, which was quickly silenced by twenty-four MLRS rockets and close air support.

  19 February—the 1st UK MLRS unit, under 1st CAV control, fired 192 rockets against nineteen targets. That night, 2/8 CAV ambushed an Iraqi MTLB and destroyed it with a TOW missile. It also took out a pair of enemy infantry squads with artillery fire.

  20 February—Operation Knight Strike was launched by Colonel Randy House's 2nd Brigade, in the largest tactical fight of the war so far for VII Corps. In a running battle with Iraqi dug-in units, 1/5 CAV, a Bradley battalion, came under heavy fire, and both a Bradley and a Vulcan air defense track took direct hits from five Iraqi tanks in revetments, followed by mortar and artillery fire. The CAV struck back with artillery and close air support, destroying the Iraqi tanks and twenty artillery pieces. During the fight, a second Bradley was hit, an M1A1 tank hit a mine, and three 1st CAV soldiers were killed (nine were wounded). One of those killed in action was PFC Ardon Cooper, who threw himself over his wounded buddies to protect them from incoming Iraqi artillery fire. For this, Cooper was awarded a posthumous Silver Star.[17]

  Even though Operation Knight Strike was successful, it showed that the Iraqis were capable of heavy concentration of fire if an attacking unit got into their prearranged fire area. But it showed as well that Iraqi fire could be quickly silenced and that they had limited ability to shift their fires from their prearranged defensive positions. The lesson was to keep them from getting set in a defensive position. You had to hit them without pause with massed combat power from an unexpected direction.

  21 February—703 MLRS rockets were fired by an MLRS unit of the 1st AD under 1st CAV control at known and suspected Iraqi targets as part of the plan for all units of the corps to get into combat operations.

  Meanwhile, 1st CAV armor and infantry units kept up almost continual direct-fire attacks against Iraqi units in the Ruqi Pocket area; they continued to break holes in the twelve-foot-high border berm, and they continued their relentless raids against Iraqi defending units. First UK artillery joined this fight on 22 February, and along with 1st CAV artillery, they conducted a massive artillery raid. Later reports indicated that this raid deceived the Iraqis into believing the ground offensive had started in this area.

  The actions by the 1st CAV Division in the Ruqi Pocket were hugely successful. They deterred any attack south by Iraqi units, destroyed significant numbers of Iraqi units and artillery (some in range of the 1st INF breach), captured prisoners, who were a valuable source of intelligence, deceived the Iraqi command about the size and direction of the VII Corps attack, provided valuable lessons about how the Iraqis could and could not fight, lessons other units in the corps would use, and allowed the aviation and artillery units of VII Corps to be skillfully employed in the artillery raids (code-named Red-storm). These raids inflicted damage on the Iraqis and gave the rest of the corps needed combat experience. It was a masterful and selfless performance by the 1st CAV that contributed in a major way to VII Corps's battle success.

  Earlier, during the first week in February, the corps began to position their logistics west to form Log Base Echo, which was to be the provisions center for the attack. To provide security for Echo, Franks moved an element of the 1st INF on the border in front of them, just west of the 1st CAV. Their orders from Franks were to show only reconnaissance units and aviation (he didn't want the Iraqis to know a force was west of the 1st CAV) so the 1st INF immediately began actions to guard the logistics site and cover the rest of the division move. VII Corps now had forces west from the Wadi approximately eighty kilometers.

  On 14 February, a Scud missile hit Hafar al Batin, narrowly missing a 1st CAV shower point. That day Franks was twenty kilometers to the east at a COSCOM briefing and could hear the impact. There were no casualties.

  More attacks were launched in front of the 1st INF on 16 February. Franks wanted to start to hit Iraqi artillery in range of the breach and to conduct some aggressive reconnaissance. He reasoned that by then the Iraqis would not be able to react very much anyway. And, besides, with the increased activity of the 1st CAV, they would not notice. But he kept the 2nd ACR and the two armored divisions hidden in the west until 23 February.

  The next day was G-Day. Fred Franks continues from here.

  CHAPTER NINE

  Coiled Spring

  VII CORPS MAIN COMMAND POST G-DAY 24 FEBRUARY 1991

  I was up at 0400 after a good night's sleep, hoping my leaders and troops were as well rested. We would need our energy.

  In a way, I was relaxed that morning — or at least relaxed in the sense that I knew we were ready and that we had the initiative. I did not think I would make any major decisions that day, one of those rare days in the last hundred when that was the case. Most of what we had spent those hundred or so days preparing was now ready to go. The main thing was we knew when we were going to attack: tomorrow, at about 0530, or BMNT. That seemed a sure thing.

  This knowledge is a definite advantage for the attacker, one not available for the defense. You can get your unit both physically arranged and mentally ready. The defenders can only wait and wonder. After all those years conceding the initiative to the Warsaw Pact in our NATO mission, I liked this much better.

  But truly relaxed? No.

  I felt the stress — we all did, soldiers and leaders alike. All over the command, the pressure was constant. Some of it was physical, due to the extended austere living conditions, especially for the soldiers, and some was mental, because we were going to war and there were a lot of big unknowns. Those who had not been in combat probably wondered how they would handle it. Those who knew combat wondered what this war would bring. There was also a sense of isolation there in the desert. As a commander, you do your best to relieve some of the stress by the command climate you set, the way you treat people, the decisions you make, and the way you make them. But getting soldiers and units ready for war also means tough decisions, hard work, and being unyielding on the need to meet rigorous battlefield standards. As for myself, my own way of relieving stress wasn't to take days off, but to visit fellow leaders and soldiers, to try to do things for them: "To lead is also to serve." They always did more for me than I did for them. They never failed to inspire me with their hard work, selfless attitude, sense of humor, and flat-out competence.

  Like most mornings over the past hundred days, the transition from sleep to waking was not gradual. As soon as I woke up, my brain switched on full throttle. From the time we had gotten the mission, I had never stopped concentrating on the myriad issues confronting us, as well as on all the details that had to be dealt with in order to get ready for and execute combat operations. That focus consumed me that day and every day as we prepared for battle. I never concentrated as hard on anything in my life. It was seven days a week, every waking second; and it probably continued in my subconscious somehow when I slept. There were no days off; I just couldn't do that. General Hancock said it right at Gettysburg: "Today, a corps commander's life is not important." I felt it was my duty to spend myself to the max for this mission and the troops for whom I was responsible. I lived it. I internalized the various parts of the corps so that I would know its behavior like my own. It was like a living part of me. We almost became as one. I was not alone in this. I had seen all my leaders and commanders do the same in their organizations.

>   So I was focused and intent on what we were about to do that morning, and especially on what we needed to do that day — to the point that I didn't notice much that was around me — yet I was also about as relaxed as a commander could be this close to a major attack. I was confident, but I knew that things rarely went exactly as planned, and I was acutely aware of my responsibilities.

  My first focus that morning was on what we call a commander's running estimate — the continuing assessment in my own head of what was going on in the corps and of possible enemy actions. A commander does this constantly, looking at the situation and war-gaming possibilities, and his staff does the same, often separated in time and distance.

  Here is how the corps looked to me that morning as I renewed our activities over the past few days.

  The main issue for us that day was to move our enveloping force (2nd ACR, 1st AD, and 3rd AD) and our breach force (1st INF) far enough forward to make the start of our attack tomorrow release like a coiled spring. This would jump-start a momentum that would not let up until we destroyed the Republican Guards, in the sector Third Army had assigned us.

  The plan for the first day of operation focused on the breach of the 1st Infantry Division. While the Big Red One conducted the deliberate breach, the 2nd ACR would continue to press on into Iraq as the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions poured their combat vehicles through the holes prepared by engineers in the ten- to twelve-foot border berm. The 1st Cavalry Division would continue its deception operations near Al Ru'Qua, and the 1st (UK) Armored Division would begin moving forward on heavy equipment transporters to exploit the 1st Infantry's breach.

  1ST INF DIVISION. Prior to this morning, elements of the 1st INF had moved forward once before. On 16 February, in order to get artillery close enough to reach Iraqi artillery in range of the breach, Tom Rhame had pushed his 1st INF, 3rd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Dave Weisman, forward to occupy the Iraqi security zone (an area in front of the Iraqi main defense that extended from the border about fifteen kilometers into Iraq). During this operation, the brigade had been in several sharp fights with Iraqi recon units and done well in their first combat. On the night of 17 February, we had had the first blue-on-blue (what some call fratricide, or so-called friendly fire) in the 1st Infantry Division, when a division Apache had fired on a 3rd Brigade Bradley and an M113, killing two of our soldiers and wounding six others. As a result, Tom Rhame, with my concurrence, had relieved the aviation battalion commander who had personally fired the fatal missile. The same day, an MLRS in the division artillery south of the border had fired by mistake into our attack positions. Though, as luck would have it, the rockets had fallen harmlessly into the sand, I was still concerned, because I wanted to build on early success. I had ordered Tom to pull the whole brigade back out of the Iraqi security zone that afternoon. That way, we reinforced our deception by signaling to the Iraqis that we were not coming at them from that direction.

  CORPS ARTILLERY. During the period just before G-Day, Iraqi artillery was our main focus, especially those capable of firing chemical munitions. Because we didn't want to give away the location of our attack, we waited until about a week before the actual assault in which our artillery, attack helicopters, and close air support would hit the Iraqi artillery that was within range of the breach. We knew the Iraqis paid a lot of attention to artillery preparations, so if we'd been pounding the area out in front of the 1st Infantry Division for a couple of weeks, they probably would have reported to the RGFC: "Hey, they've got some sizable forces out here. Looks like they're coming farther west of the Wadi."

  Later on G-Day, artillery would move into position before the 1st INF attack for two hours of preparatory fires into the breach area, in order to destroy the Iraqi artillery in range of the breach site. This prep fire had been planned by Brigadier General Creighton Abrams and Colonel Mike Dotson, the Big Red One Division artillery commander, and it would be shot by the 1st INF Division artillery, reinforced by three VII Corps artillery brigades, the 42nd, 75th, and 142nd, and the artillery of the 1st UK Division. After their firing mission, the 42nd and 75th Artillery Brigades would move through the newly opened breach and join the enveloping 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, respectively, to reinforce the fires of their division artillery units in time for those division attacks on the RGFC.

  ENVELOPING FORCE. Here our challenge was to find sufficient room to maneuver—1st AD, with their twenty-five kilometers of front on the Iraqi border, and 3rd AD, with their fifteen kilometers next to them.

  I had given 1st Armored the extra room so that Ron Griffith could put two of his three ground-maneuver brigades side by side in a desert wedge (one brigade leading, followed by two brigades abreast). That way, he wouldn't be held up by time-consuming repositioning when we released the coiled spring. I wanted 1st Armored really fast off the mark — as though shot from a cannon toward Objective Purple, the Iraqi VII Corps logistics site at the Iraqi village of al-Busayyah, some 120 kilometers north of the border.

  Given the enemy forces and the terrain he had to get through, I had estimated Ron would reach Purple about eight hours after H-Hour. Once he had seized that objective, we would have a major maneuver force north and west of the RGFC, one that was positioned to outflank any RGFC attack that might come west or southwest of their present locations to meet our enveloping force. (Iraqi forces habitually met a penetration attack head-on, and not from the flanks, as our doctrine advises.)

  Because 1st AD had to be launched quickly, Butch Funk and his 3rd Armored Division had to start in a column of brigades that would initially extend almost 120 kilometers to the rear. Though 3rd AD was our corps reserve, they were not stationary. I wanted them moved forward across the border today, and I wanted them to get into a better offensive formation before they attacked tomorrow. Once he crossed the border and we got him more room, he could shift to whatever attack formation he thought necessary for the missions I had assigned him. It would take time, but I thought they would have time on G-Day and G+1 to get into another tactical formation before I committed them to any of the contingencies we had war-gamed.

  While preparing for this maneuver, Butch also had to contend with another contingency, one that he handled with the kind of ease I'd come to expect from him: If CENTCOM committed the 1st Cavalry Division to JFC-North, then VII Corps was responsible for providing 1st CAV with a third maneuver brigade to replace the one 1st CAV had given earlier to the U.S. Marines. If that happened, I planned to order Butch to send one of his brigades to 1st CAV. Cal Waller had gotten my recommendation on this approved by Schwarzkopf, instead of CENTCOM's first choice, which had been 2nd AD (Forward) out of 1st INF.

  The mission of our other enveloping force, the 2nd ACR, was to be out front and to provide offensive cover to cover the movement of the two armored divisions as they attacked toward Objective Collins about 150 kilometers from their line of departure. In order to get a better start on it, Don Holder had requested that his 2nd Cavalry Regiment move forty kilometers forward into Iraq to their Phase Line Busch[18] (2nd ACR had named all their phase lines after beers). This would not only put him about thirty minutes ahead of the two divisions, it would clear the area and allow the divisions to move up across the Iraqi border. (We wanted to lean as far forward as possible without tipping our hand.)

  Yesterday, the regiment had moved forward about twenty kilometers beyond the border to their Phase Line Bud to clear the area south of the berm for the two follow-on divisions and to prepare for their move to Busch (they'd push their aviation forward of that). Though I had approved Don Holder's request for these moves, I had ordered him to show only aviation and artillery to any Iraqis out there, in order not to tip our hand early. The regiment had fired their first round in combat at 1330 the day before in a ten-minute artillery preparation fire. By 1400, 2nd Squadron, preceded by the 4th, or Aviation, Squadron (nicknamed "Redcatcher" after our Cold War days), had all pushed across the border without incident. At 1628, however, two soldiers had been wounded when
their vehicle had run over one of our own DPICM[19] munitions. The men were medevaced. At 1900, 3rd Squadron reported enemy dismounted infantry in their area, and the troops were assessed to be from the Iraqi 26th Division (thus confirming our intelligence that the 26th had a brigade in depth to refuse the west flank of the Iraqi VII Corps). Meanwhile, 4th Squadron reported that the twenty kilometers forward to Phase Line Busch were clear of enemy. By 2100, the regiment had reached Bud and had cut forty-three lanes in the double-border berm, both for their own passage and for assisting the two follow-on divisions, which would need to cut more.

  The coiling of our coiled spring was to be on the Iraqi side of the border — just cleared out by the 2nd ACR. Both 1st AD and 3rd AD would have more room on the other side of the border, and they would also have gotten through all of the friction of passing through the lanes in the berm and reassembling.

  Making it through the border berms turned out to be slow going for some of our units. The holes we had cut in the berms acted like "filters," and it took time to go through one by one, and then to get into some sort of tactical grouping. In one battalion, units got so disoriented in the dark and mixed with vehicles from other units that the commander pulled them south of the berm to reenter Iraq the next day.

  207TH MI BRIGADE. Our newly acquired Pioneer UAVs (the first UAVs used in combat by the U.S. Army) were an immediate help in targeting Iraqi artillery. By G-Day, through bomb damage assessment provided by Pioneer flights, we had detected the destruction of sixty-five Iraqi artillery pieces and FROG (Free Rockets Over Ground). The Pioneers had also flown a mission in support of General Saleh Halaby's Egyptian Corps on our east flank.